The False Doctrine of Nuclear Deterrence
Nuclear deterrence is frequently framed as a foundational pillar of national security, yet it relies on unproven theories, fragile assumptions, and sheer luck. Proponents of deterrence often dismiss disarmament advocates as naïve, but the reliance on weapons of mass destruction introduces existential risks that contradict national security goals. Questioning the Effectiveness of Deterrence Philosophers like Jean-Pierre Dupuy and experts like Daniel Ellsberg argue that nuclear deterrence has played a negligible role in avoiding nuclear war. Major powers have prioritized first-strike capabilities over defensive restraint, which renders the concept of deterrence ineffective in real-world scenarios. Historical data shows that nuclear weapons have failed to prevent direct conflicts between nuclear-armed states, such as the 1969 Sino-Soviet border clashes and ongoing tensions between India and Pakistan. Non-nuclear states have also frequently attacked nuclear-armed nations, as seen in the Vietnam War, the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict, and the recent invasion of Ukraine. A Secular Religion of Security The belief in nuclear deterrence has evolved into a dogma where critics are treated as dissenters. A "clergy" of military personnel, engineers, and political leaders sustains this belief system, treating nuclear weapons as an unquestionable raison d'être for national sovereignty. The Contradiction of 'Final Warnings' French strategic doctrine presents a fundamental paradox: claiming nuclear weapons guarantee security while simultaneously planning for the failure of deterrence via a "final warning" strike. A proposed "non-renewable" nuclear warning strike, utilizing high-yield warheads (100–300 kt), would likely cause catastrophic humanitarian destruction. Rather than restoring deterrence, such an action would predictably trigger an all-out nuclear response, leading to mutual annihilation rather than de-escalation.
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