The False Doctrine of Nuclear Deterrence

• Nuclear deterrence is frequently framed as a foundational pillar of national security, yet it relies on unproven theories, fragile assumptions, and sheer luck.
• Proponents of deterrence often dismiss disarmament advocates as naïve, but the reliance on weapons of mass destruction introduces existential risks that contradict national security goals.

Questioning the Effectiveness of Deterrence

• Philosophers like Jean-Pierre Dupuy and experts like Daniel Ellsberg argue that nuclear deterrence has played a negligible role in avoiding nuclear war.
• Major powers have prioritized first-strike capabilities over defensive restraint, which renders the concept of deterrence ineffective in real-world scenarios.
• Historical data shows that nuclear weapons have failed to prevent direct conflicts between nuclear-armed states, such as the 1969 Sino-Soviet border clashes and ongoing tensions between India and Pakistan.
• Non-nuclear states have also frequently attacked nuclear-armed nations, as seen in the Vietnam War, the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict, and the recent invasion of Ukraine.

A Secular Religion of Security

• The belief in nuclear deterrence has evolved into a dogma where critics are treated as dissenters.
• A "clergy" of military personnel, engineers, and political leaders sustains this belief system, treating nuclear weapons as an unquestionable raison d'être for national sovereignty.

The Contradiction of 'Final Warnings'

• French strategic doctrine presents a fundamental paradox: claiming nuclear weapons guarantee security while simultaneously planning for the failure of deterrence via a "final warning" strike.
• A proposed "non-renewable" nuclear warning strike, utilizing high-yield warheads (100–300 kt), would likely cause catastrophic humanitarian destruction.
• Rather than restoring deterrence, such an action would predictably trigger an all-out nuclear response, leading to mutual annihilation rather than de-escalation.